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Abstract
This article aims to scrutinise the phenomenon of proliferation 
of local government units in Indonesia in order to understand 
how identity politics has evolved within and through the process 
of decentralization. In doing so, there are several points to make. 
The numbers of districts and municipalities in Indonesia have 
doubled within six years. Local governments have proliferated 
in the sense that the numbers of local government units have 
multiplied rapidly in such a short period. There were ‘only’ a 
little bit more than 200 units when Suharto stepped down in 
1998, and that had more than doubled to 466 units in 2006. 
Interestingly, this took place in an absence of a definite plan, 
as the state showed its enthusiasm for decentralisation and a 
bottom-up process of decision-making. 
First, the state can no longer maintain its hegemonic role. 
Under the regimes of Sukarno and Suharto, the state possessed 
relatively effective technocratic and bureaucratic apparatus that 
ensured effective control over its people and agenda. Through 
technocratically equipped bureaucracies the state mobilised 
certain kinds of discourses that, in turn, defined what was deemed 
1 This article is developed from a seminar paper presented at the International 
Convention of Asia Scholars, Kuala Lumpur Convention Centre, 2-5 August 
2007.
2 Purwo Santoso is a proffessor in political science at Department of Politics 
and Government, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah 
Mada, Indonesia
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2 proper under the banner of ethnic and religious solidarity. 
Second, local elites play critical roles in the process of proliferation. 
Moreover, in many cases their roles have reversed since the fall of 
the New Order. Previously, they were co-opted by the state but 
now, they are co-opting the state. Why is that so? The state is well 
aware of and even too sensitive to the potential of ethnic-based, 
race-motivated conflict, as well as secession (Wellman 2005). 
Indeed, conflicts did take place quite extensively in Indonesia 
for that reason. As a result, the state opts to accommodate the 
interests of local elites instead of confronting them. In other 
words, proliferation of local government serves as a strategy for 
preventing political disintegration. Local autonomy is currently 
the best available solution to ethnic conflict in Indonesia 
(Bertrand 2004).
Third, the proliferation of local governments confirms the 
importance of territoriality or territorial attachment (Kahler 
and Walter 2006). Territory serves as a basis for identity politics. 
By establishing a new set of local governments, the central 
government still retains territorial control and, at the same time, 
local activists also have an opportunity to do so.
Up until recently, the idea of nation state—namely one state 
containing one nationhood—was an intensely inspiring institutional 
design for states all over the world. The term ‘national’ typically 
implies coverage as extentsive as the territory of a particular state. 
There are various kinds of nationalism: ethno-nationalism, religio-
nationalism, and so on. Nonetheless, only one type of nationhood 
really fits the need of the state–that is the statewide nationhood. 
A miss-match of national sentiment toward the authority of state 
generates problems of either secession or demands for the integrating 
of partial territories of two separate states.
The salience of identity politics poses challenges in sustaining the 
idea of the nation state. Moreover, we can no longer expect states to 
keep trying to manage —if not manipulate—  the changing dynamics 
of nationhood. A state is deemed necessary to engage in a process 
of self-transformation to contain the dynamics of identity politics. 
Despite this necessity, Indonesia is witnessing the proliferation of 
local governments in response to the rising demand for recognition 
of local interests and identities.
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3Prior to examine Indonesian case, it is important to note what 
is at stake here is the institutional design of a state. In order to avoid 
ill judgement on what is happening in Indonesia, it is worthwhile to 
take a closer look at the fundamental design of what a ‘nation state’ 
is. Uncovering the flaws of nation states first would lead to a carefull 
analysis on Indonesian affairs.   
Coming to terms with nation state
In order to proportionally comprehend the extent Indonesia is 
in trouble in its performance as a nation state, we need to set out 
a clear idea of the actual features of a nation state. There are two 
separate ideas we need to clarify, namely ‘state’ and ‘nation’. Let’s be 
clear what a state really means. Since agreement on exact defition 
of a state has not been possible,3 the easiest way to grasp the idea 
is by identifyng formal characteristic instrinsic to the state. Andrew 
Vincent’s description is worthy to quote despite its length. A state: 
“...has a geographically identifieable territory with a body of 
citizens. It claims authority over all citizens and groups within 
its boundaries and embodies more comprehensive aims than 
other associations. The authority of the state is legal in character 
and is usually seen as the source of law. It is based on procedural 
rules which have more general recognition in society than 
other rules. The procedures of the state are operated by trained 
bureaucraies. The state also embodies the maximum control 
of resourcess and force within a territory. Its monopoly is not 
simply premised on force: most states try to claim legitimacy for 
such monopoly, namely, they seek recognition and acceptance 
from the population. In consequence, to be a member of state 
implies a civil disposition. Further, the state is seen as sovereign, 
both in internal sense within territory, and in an external sense, 
namely, the state is recognised by other states as an equal member 
of international society. It should be noted, however, that the 
idea of the state changes with a different sense of sovereignty. 
Finally, the state as a continuous public power is distinct from 
3 Vincent, Andrew, ‘Conceptions of the State’ in Mary Hawkesworth and 
Maurice Kogan (eds.), 1992,  Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, London: 
Routledge. See also Hoffman, John, 1995, Beyond the State, Oxford: Polity 
Press.
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4 rulers and ruled.”4
In describing the state, Vincent has not implied nationhood or 
nationalism as a pre-requirement for the existence of a state. He, 
however, has mentioned citizens, population, groups, society, and 
other associations as the subjects of a state. How can we differentiate 
them from the state? The defining line between them is that the state 
has a legitimate monopoly in the use of force. What makes citizens, 
the population, groups, society or other associations unite together? 
There are many uniting factors at work that allow a state to be more 
comprehenvise than any other association. They include the sets of 
procedures, law, bureaucracy, and so on.
What is a nation then? A nation is a kind of uniting sentiment. 
It could ‘merely’ be a shared imagination of community.5 The uniting 
capacity of nationhood could lead to various processes: territorial 
integration; freedom of political association; cultural survival; 
popular sovereignty under a liberal and democratic constitution; or 
even ethnic segregation.6 The idea of a nation does not presuppose the 
existence of a state. Max Weber, however, has suggested that the idea 
of nation tended to be associated with the idea of state. By quoting 
Weber, Gilber suggested that: “A nation is a community of sentiment 
which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own: hence 
a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state 
of its own”7. He even treated a nation “as a group of people wishing 
to associate in the same state”.8 The mobilisation of sentiment for 
enhancing nationhood is called nationalism.
The ‘nation state’, essentially, is the meeting point between 
nationhood and statehood. The idea of the nation state implies 
optimism that they are both compatible and even mutually 
4 Ibid. p. 44.
5 See Anderson, B.R.O.G., 1991, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso
6 Gilbert, Paul, 1998, The Philosophy of Nationalism, Boulder Corolado: Westview 
Press, p. 8.
7 Ibid. p. 14-15. See also Reis, Elisa P., “The Lasting Marriage Between Nation 
and State Despite Globalization” in International Political Science Review 
(2004), Vol 25, No. 3, 251-257, p. 252. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601666, 
downloaded, 18/03/2011 17:08  
8 Ibid. p. 90.Italic from its original.
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5enforcing. Nationalism, for those who are sympathetic to the nation 
state, would enhance state building. The idea of nation state implies 
that the state is the best setup for containing nationhood. It even 
makes nationhood functional by the way easing state in performing 
its normative duties, for example in mobilizing obedience from its 
subjects it is easier for the state to invoke the romantic sentiment of 
its subjects as member of a single nation and the state as its ultimate 
representation. Unfortunately, this is not always the case.
In some other cases, the nation state is an awkward mix. Its 
existance and the functioning entail a number of prerequisites. Its 
existence is supported by both a strong sense of citizenship and 
effective state control. By this strong sense of citizenship, the author 
refers to, respectively, the commonly shared perception of belonging 
to the same community of nation among the citizens of that given 
nation state and the state as the political manifestation of this common 
sense of belonging. This common sense of belonging and perception 
over the state as its manifestation entails certain expectations among 
this group of people. This leads to what the author here refers to the 
notion of effective state control that is the ability of the correlated 
state, on the one hand, to fulfill this expectation and, on the other 
hand, to structure what its public expect from it. In this article, this 
process is perceived as a continuous and dynamic process.
The state is an institutional setup within which daily politics is 
shaped. As an institutional setup, the idea of the national state has 
not been easily institutionalised. This implies that decision making 
and institutional building within the country is bound to fail as its 
foundation—the idea of nation state—happened to be on shaky 
ground and remains a slippery concept. Indonensia as a nation state 
is in trouble beacause of the difficulties it faces in—if it was serious 
enough–bringing it about the projected idea of nation–state into 
living institutions. The unfinished process of nation building, namely 
the process of creating new and uniting various facets of collective 
identities, exacerbates problem sharing and distributive justice.
How the forementioned process takes place and the form of 
nation–state institution it produces vary in different times and places. 
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6 In Indonesian case, it is important to note that despite the diversity 
of the meanings for democracy, Indonesia is bound to follow an 
institutional arrangement set by its colonial state predecesor–liberal 
democracy.9 The nation state, within the framework of liberal 
democracy, presupposes the existence of citizens with a strong sense 
of citizenship. Its colonial history has also been proven to be a critical 
factor that structures Indonesia’s trajectory as a modern state, as its 
nationalist and territorial claims are based on the common history of 
living under foreign colonial rule and common willingness to break 
away from it as an independent nation on the exactly same territory.10 
This obsession to transform Indonesia into a modern nation–
state entails some pre-requirements to be fulfilled namely the 
formation of stong sense of citizenship and effective state. These are 
necessary requirements for a nation–state to perform its normative 
role, namely to allocate value before its people in an authoritative 
way.11 This has been proven a challenge due to the broad diversity of 
Indonesian society, not only along the cleavages of political ideologies 
and socio–economic classes but also with with the overlapping ethnic 
and religious lines. Each of them has different projection about what 
Indonesia is and what Indonesia should be. In order to suture these 
diverse elements into a single society of nation within a single polity 
of a state, it is necessary to arrange those diverse elements into certain 
9 Immediately after its independence, Indonesia engaged in an experiment to 
put the idea of liberal democracy into practice. Unable to take this seriously, 
President Sukarno decided to replace with the so-called Guided Democracy. 
Suharto’s regime of the New Order retained the underpinning idea of Guided 
Democracy–that is the centrality and totality of the state as the representation 
of Indonesian nationalism. The basic idea was that the president holds full 
control of the political process and even the political system. Even though the 
term Guided Democracy was invested by Sukarno, it was President Suharto 
who managed to fully practise it. Unlike Sukarno who had very limited room 
for asserting leadership, Suharto enjoyed much more room for establishing 
control. Why was that so? Sukarno was stuck in between, and hence bound 
to balance the two opposing major forces—the communists and the military. 
Suharto secured effective control because he succeeded in eradicating the 
communists as an effective political power in Indonesia.   
10 Therefore Indonesia’s territory nowadays includes the southern half of Borneo 
or Kalimantan and the western half of Papua. The Indonesian claims over these 
areas are based on the fact that they were part of the Netherland Indies colonial 
state.
11 Easton, David, 1965, Framework for Political Analysis, Prentice-Hall, Englewood 
Clift, New Jersey, 1965.
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7place that, on the one hand, enable them to channel their particular 
expression and aspirations while, on the other hand, ensure that 
their particular expressions and aspirations would not endanger the 
broader society of nation as a whole.
Considering the dynamic and fluid nature of those diverse 
elements of Indonesian society and also their respective projections 
about what Indonesia is, what Indonesia should be, and their 
positions and other elements within these projections of Indonesia, 
we may perceive the attempt to arrange these diverse elements into 
relatively stable positions within the framework of Indonesia nation 
state as a hegemonic intervention.12 This proposition implies that 
any notion of Indonesian nation–state should be able to stand across 
and above those diverse social cleavages.
Figure 1:
Interrelation between the problem areas
Source: Paddison, 1983
The very idea of a state implies the operation of four vital 
issue—monopoly, legitimacy, territory and force. These, as Hoffman 
has suggested, entailed serious tension, if not contradiction, among 
themselves.13 Establishing hegemony is actually finding the correct 
12  Jorgensen, Mariane and Louise Philips, 2002, Discourse Analysis as Theory and 
Method, London: Sage Publications, p. 48
13  Hoffman, op.cit.
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8 balance among these issues in a correct time as they are actually 
dynamic forces. In a slighly different tone, Paddison (by reffering to 
Binder et.al.) has identified five problem areas common to almost 
every single state. They are: 1) identity; 2) legitimacy; 3) participation; 
4) penetration; 5) distribution. They are interrelated, as Figure 1 
shows, but the core of the problem is legitimacy.14
For Paddison, identity has been viewed as a matter of mutual 
sentiment among members of a given territorial group towards 
government. There are national as well as sub-national identities. The 
existence of a nation state creates a problem of national identity and 
how this national identity relates to other sub-national identities. It is 
problematic when a sub-national identity serves more as a competitor 
rather than as complementing the national identity. It would be 
very likely to negatively affect that given state’s legitimacy as, in such 
situation, the citizens of this given country who belong to the sub-
national group in question would tend to question or even resist 
the state’s policy. For Paddison, legitimacy referred to a matter of 
acceptance of government decisions because of the ‘rightness’ by which 
they were derived. The state’s legitimacy would, therefore, be low if 
the rightness of its decisions was constantly questioned by its subjects. 
Participation refers to who contribute to the decision-making process. 
The absence of participation would make decisions either inacurate 
and unacceptable. The other problem, namely penetration, referred 
to the effectiveness of government control. And lastly, the problem 
of distribution. For Paddison, it was about the extent of decisions to 
distribute/redistribute material benefits within society.15 
While Paddison has recognised the rightness of state decisions 
and distribution/redistribution of material benefits among members 
of the society as determining factors for a state’s legitimacy, other 
scholars have offered other dimensions worthy analysing. In this 
regard, Stephan Leibfried and Michael Zürn proposed an interesting 
idea. They identified four dimensions which, together, represent the 
14  Paddison, Ronan, 1983, The Fragmented State: The Political Geography of Power, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwel
15 Paddison, op.cit., p. 9.
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9essentials of a state. Those four are: resource; legality; legitimacy; 
and welfare. The salience of resource dimension resulted in the 
construction of a modern territorial state. The question on legality 
of the state has raised the issues related to law and sovereignty, while 
the type of legitimacy has been anchored by the idea of a nation state 
being democratic. Lastly, the quest for welfare has contributed to 
debate on wheter the state should be interventionist or leave matters 
to the market. The manifestation of these four dimensions has 
brought to the fore four inter-related issue: territorial state; rule of law, 
democracy; and state intervention. They have put the fours issue into 
a simple abbreviation–TRUDI.16 Through analysis of those issues, 
the dynamic of a state’s reform would be detectable in the way it deals 
with territorial issue, rule of law, democracy, and state intervention. 
The combination of the dimension point to eight potential directions 
for change: 1) localisation; 2) liberalisation (deregulation); 3) 
transnationalisation; 4) regionalisation; 5) internationalisation; 6) 
fragmentation; 7) socialisation; 8) supranationalisation. 
Table 1: Change in TRUDI
Subnationalisation
TERRITORIAL CHANGE
Status quo ante Interna-tionalisation
O
RG
AN
IS
AT
IO
N
AL
 
C
H
AN
G
E
Privatisation Localisation Liberalisation (deregulation)
Transnationa l-
isation
Status quo ante Regionalisation STATUS QUO ANTE
Internationa l-
isation
State expansion Fragmentation Socialisation (nationalisation)
Supranationa l-
isation
Source: Stephan Leibfried and Michael Zürn, 2005.
Where does state transformation in Indonesia lead? Analytical 
tools developed by Leibfried and Zürn would be useful in uncovering 
what has been happening. Unlike the reform in OECD countries 
16 Stephan Leibfried and Michael Zürn (eds.), 2005, Transformation of the State?, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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10 which have been outward looking, the transformation process 
in Indonesia has basically been inward looking. Wherever the 
change has led it would neither be considered transnationalisation, 
internationalisation, nor supranationalisation. Special attention to 
the dynamics at the sub-national level would direct us to identifying 
either localisation, regionalisation, or fragmentation.
States, as member of international community, are proliferating 
in response to structural changes. It is therefore not so surprising to see 
that local government are also proliferating. At issue here is how this 
comes about. If we agreed Leibfried and Zürn, proliferation would 
certainly be because of the problems of resources, legality, legitimacy and 
welfare.17 For Paddison, it would be a matter of identity, participation, 
legitimacy, penetration and distribution. For Hoffman, meanwhile, it 
would be a matter of monopoly, legitimacy, territory, and force. These 
ideas basically refer to the same thing: the state as an organised power. 
They all emphasise the importance of securing legitimacy. This section 
makes best use of those ideas in uncovering how the proliferation of 
local governments has occurred in Indonesia.
Identity Politics under the Hegemony of ‘Guided Democracy’ 
and ‘New Order’ Indonesia 
Initially, the political discourse in Indonesia equalized this 
strong sense of citizenship and nationalism even to some extreme 
sense during the period of Indonesian War of Independence (1945–
1949). In some areas, the manifestations of these two notions came 
not only as struggle against the attempt from the Dutch to reestablish 
the Netherland–Indie colonial state after the Second World War but 
also against the previously existing social system such as feudalism.18 
17 Ibid.
18 See Said, H. Mohammed, Benedict Anderson, and Toenggoel Siagian, “What 
was the ‘Social Revolution of 1946’ in East Sumatera”, in Indonesia, No. 15 
(April 1973), pp. 144–186; downloaded from http://cip.cornell.edu/DPubS
?service=Repository&version=1.0&verb=Disseminate&view=body&conte
nt-type=pdf_1&handle=seap.indo/1107128621#, 27 May 2013; ; See Lucas, 
Anton, 1991, One Soul One Struggle: Region and Revolution in Indonesia, Asian 
Studies Association of Australia; see also Cribb, Robert, 2009, Gangsters and 
Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People’s Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945–
1949, Equinox Publishing, first published in 1991 by Allen & Unwin 
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11The nationalist and revolutionaries’ fervor at that time envisioned an 
imagination of society based on a mixed notion of equality, either 
based on the idea of socialism/Marxism or socialist-leaning-religious 
interpretation, across ethnic boundaries. However, these movements 
ended up to collide with the values formally the newly born 
Indonesian state intended to endorse and the ways it intended how 
these values should be enforced. In dominant Indonesian historical 
discourse, most of those cases of social revolutions are considered as 
somehow abrupt moments when chaos emerged during the vacuum 
of power. Some of these movements are also directly or indirectly 
associated with the cursed Communist movement in Indonesia.
Besides the political cleavage along ideological lines, there has 
always been contention over the issue of relationship between Java and 
the outer islands within this Indonesia nation–state. This has been an 
object of contention because there has been an ever present anxiety, 
even among the Indonesian nationalists in the outer island, over the 
potential of Java domination in the emerging Indonesian state. In the 
1950s, this tension erupted into armed rebellions in many areas in 
Indonesia as also found in the 2000s in Aceh and Papua.
The regimes that have managed to establish their rules in 
Indonesia were all aware of the ever present potentials of different 
and even conflicting expectations and projections about Indonesia 
nation–state. This is particularly obvious when we take closer look 
on the two authoritarian regimes, Sukarno’s Guided Democracy 
and Suharto’s New Order, prior to the (re)introduction of liberal 
democracy in post–1998 Indonesia. After nearly a decade experiment 
with liberal–parliamentary model of democracy, claimed to be a 
failure, Sukarno came up with a “Guided Democracy” promised to 
be an alternative more suitable with Indonesian context and better to 
lead Indonesia into a modern nation–state than the Western model 
of liberal democracy. The same tone, especially against Western 
model of liberal democracy, was also sounded throughout the period 
of Suharto’s New Order rule.
These two regimes were relatively successful to manage the 
potentials clashes of various projections of Indonesia through 
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12 hegemonic interventions. The hegemonies produced by these two 
regimes involved creation and continuous re-production of certain 
myths regarding Indonesia as a nation–state. These myths are 
mixtures of various claims from various sources ranging from some 
ancient fairy tales to the most modern scientific–sound ones. Those 
myths were reproduced systematically through the education system, 
through the state bureaucratic machinery, and even through the very 
social fabrics cooptated by the state.19
Through these hegemonic interventions, those two regimes 
construct Indonesia nation–state as a totalitarian polity. Indonesia 
was projected as a total polity, where the state; and even further; 
the personal leaders of the respective regimes, was perceived as the 
embodiment of the Indonesian nation’s collective will. This ‘collective 
will’ here refers not to the sum aggregation of the will of individual 
Indonesians, but as Indonesian as a collectivity, as a nation attainable 
only for the state and through the state.   
These regimes maintained some of the diverse elements and 
arrange them around the myths as the centers of the hegemony, 
rearticulated those elements and gave them certain meanings within 
the existing hegemonic structures. By doing so, those regimes 
established themselves across and above the existing political 
ideologies; social cleavages; and divisions. Sukarno’s Guided 
Democracy rallied those elements around his notions of Indonesian 
Revolution while Suharto’s New Order used national economic 
development as its myth.
Under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and later more 
systematically furthered under Suharto’s New Order regime, the 
cultural groups which comprise Indonesia and actually may make 
their justifiable claim of their own nation - hood were positioned 
as “suku”. The parallel term in English for this “suku” is tribe, but 
in the discourses of Indonesia under those two regimes this “suku” 
refers to different thing in comparison with “English” tribe. Sukarno 
19 See McVey, Ruth T., “The Beamtenstaat in Indonesia” in Anderson, B.R.O.G. 
and Audery Kahin (eds.), 2010, Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen 
Contributions to the Debate, Singapore: Equinox Publishing PTE. Ltd
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13used the allegory of “centipede” to describe these various “suku”s with 
Indonesia nation. Indonesia is the body while these “suku”s are the 
legs. He came to this interpretation as “suku” means leg in refined 
Javanese language. Sukarno acknowledged that these ‘suku’s might 
have made justifiable claim of nation-hood, but since there had 
been a consent for these ‘suku’s to live together as a single nation of 
Indonesia, referring to the mythical consent among various groups 
to live as one nation during the event of Youth Pledge in 1928, they 
cease as nations and become ‘suku’s within this one new nation.20
This discourse was also incorporated under Suharto’s New Order 
regime. Various elements of Indonesian society were incorporated 
as elements of the state forming the so called ‘state–corporatism.21 
This included the socio–political groups based on ethno–religious 
notions.22 Under these regimes we saw the formation of various 
state–sponsored social organizations based on religious and ethnic 
identities. Within the hegemonic structure of the New Order these 
organizations systematically served as channels for those members 
of those groups to express their aspirations, including access over 
resources, as well as means of control for the regime so those 
aspirations would not threaten its hegemonic position.
Under both regimes, certain manifestations of identity politics 
were relatively successfully managed. Sukarno’s hegemony utilized 
the myth of national unity in the context of struggle against 
colonialism remarkably well to ensure the loyalty of certain vital 
elements to the cause of independence like in the case of the grant of 
special autonomous status to the provinces of Aceh and Yogyakarta 
and the formation of the province of Central Kalimantan for the 
Dayaks.23 One of the formally expressed arguments for these policies 
20 See Sukarno, Bapperki Supaya Menjadi Sumbangan Besar Terhadap Revolusi 
Indonesia–For Bapperki to Significantly Contribute for Indonesian Revolution, 
Speech in the VIII Bapperki Congress, Gelora Bung Karno Sport Hall, 14 
Maret 1963, http://www.munindo.brd.de/artikel/artbaperki4.html
21 McIntyre, Andrew, 1994, Organising Interest: Corporatism in Indonesian Politics, 
Working Paper No.43, Asia Research Center, Murdoch University, Australia; 
downloaded from http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/publications/wp/WP43.
pdf; 27 May 2013.   
22 McIntyre, op.cit., pp. 6–7.
23 By 1957, precisely during the 17th anniversary of Indonesia’s independence, 
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14 has been because the people in these regions have shown their loyalty 
and supports for the cause of independence during the Indonesian 
war of independence. By doing so Sukarno has simultaneously, first, 
maintained and ensured the loyalty of the public in these regions 
to the central government in Jakarta by allowing them to find their 
particular expression within the broader framework of Indonesian 
nation–state. Second, he also institutionalized the myth of national 
unity in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism as the 
moral beacon to which the whole national potential energy should 
be directed, including the expression of particular identities.
Under Suharto’s New Order Regime, different myths were 
introduced. However, the operating mechanism was pretty similar, 
even more systematic due to the heavier obsession this regime had 
to modernity. Economic development replaced the struggle against 
colonialism and imperialism and became the defining criteria for 
particular expression of identity politics to earn its place within the 
hegemonic structure. Particular elements were governed through 
more systematic structure of corporatism.24 
Despite the differences in myths and operating mechanism of 
these two regimes, there are startling similarities on how they operated 
in managing the emerging identity politics during their rules. There 
are certain common features and elements of the strategic games 
played by these two regimes to attain and maintain their hegemonic 
positions. First, both regimes utilized the state with more authority 
to intervene into public life, including the market. This was only 
possible as they were able to secure their claim of the inseparability 
between the regime and state. The state was presented as the ultimate 
embodiment of the general public will in both regimes. Thus, the 
state/regime stood across political ideologies and social cleavages. By 
doing so, those regimes also put their claimed monopoly the identity 
of Indonesia as nation of collective whole, of its representation, 
President Sukarno proclaimed Central Kalimantan as the 17th province. A 
number of provinces were established in the 1950s. The establishment of these 
new provinces is also related to a number of local-level rebellions that took place 
within the same period. See Tirtosudarmo, Riwanto, 2007, Mencari Indonesia: 
Demografi–Politik Pasca-Suharto, Jakarta: YOI.
24 McIntyre, op.cit.
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15of its state bureaucratic machinaries; civil and military, and of the 
possession of the whole national territory and resources and the 
authority to distribute them.25
Second, both regimes enjoyed hegemonic position since they 
were able to define the authoritative moral standards through which 
the expressions of particular identity politics were governed. In other 
word, these two regimes were able to earn the legitimacy for their 
rule. Those regimes earned and reproduced their legitimacy through 
strategic games of identification, participation, distribution, and 
penetration among various elements that comprised Indonesian 
society. Both regimes engaged in continous struggle to maintain 
and reproduce the legitimacy they earned through monolithic 
interpretation of the myths they created to govern the multitude of 
Indonesian society. Sukarno came up with his Panca Azimat Revolusi 
(Five Heirlooms of the Revolution) and Nasakom (Nasionalis, Agama, 
Komunis or Nationalist, Religion, and Communist) while Suharto 
with Pancasila (Five Principles) and the Pedoman Penghayatan 
dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Guidance for Understanding and 
Implementing Pancasila). Both were enforced with the ever present 
potential use of coercive means monopolized by the state.26  
This however does not mean that through the state both regimes 
were able to suture Indonesian society as a final totality. Both regimes 
faced the perennial challenges of the lack of state penetration capacity. 
Both regimes were hardly able to engage Indonesian public individualy 
and directly, especially over the issue of social and economic welfare. 
This situation has two implications. First, there is always economic 
gap among regions in Indonesia and among groups within the society. 
Second, most Indonesians live their daily life more as members of their 
particular social formations and hardly as citizens. In fact, most of them 
owe their political, economic, and social well–being through their 
25 This refers to the Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia, stating “The 
earth, the water, the air and the whole embedded natural resources are owned 
by the state and used for the maximum welfare of the society”
26 The use of coercive means, both actually and potentially, were never absent during 
for both regimes to establish their hegemonies. Under the Sukarno’s “Guided 
Democracy” and Suharto’s “New Order” there were certain social elements 
branded as dissidents and banned and their proponents were persecuted.
Proliferation of Local Governments in Indonesia ...
16 memberships in these particular social formations.27 These potential 
problems did not emerge to the surface while there was strong regime 
that had the capacity to keep them checked. But once such regime 
collaps it is like hell breaks loose.
The following part will discuss how the democratic regime in 
Indonesia fails to attain hegemonic position and how this situation 
contributes to the emergence of identity politics leading to the 
proliferation of local governments in Indonesia.
The Failure of Democratic Regime to Become Hegemony in Post 
1998 Indonesia
The introduction of democratic principles and values after the 
collapse of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ implies major institutional change 
over relationship between the state and its public in Indonesia. 
The collapse of New Order regime in 1998 took place almost 
simultaneously with every symbol and value associated with this 
regime, like centralism, monolithic interpretation, authoritarianism, 
state-corporatism, etc. Authoritarian and centralised rule has been 
blamed for numerous and massive violent conflicts in some parts of 
the coutry, as well as the potential dissolution of the state.28 Repressive 
rule by the corrupt state has basically been a reflection of its weakness 
in governing its huge and diverse commutnity.29 Amidst this dire 
situation, there was strong hope that despite numoerous obstacles it 
could bring up a decentralised system of government would prevent 
the state from breaking up.30 
27 This marks another loophole in the, either ‘Guided Democracy’ or ‘New Order’ 
regime as the state corporatism coexisted with patron–client relationship and 
somehow enjoyed some mutual benefits from each other. McIntyre, op.cit., pp. 3–4.
28 Syamsul Hadi et. al. (eds.), Disintegrasi Pasca Orde Baru: Negara, Konflik Lokal 
dan Dinamika International, Centre for International Relation Studies (CIReS) 
FISIP UI in cooperation with Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta 2007.
29 Nono Anwar Makarim, ‘Pemerintahan yang Lemah dan Konflik’, in Dewi 
Fortuna Anwer et. al. (eds.), 2005, Konflik Kekerasan Internal: Tinjauan 
Sejarah, Ekonomi-Politik, dan Kebijakan di Asia Pasifik, Jakarta: Yayasan Obor 
Indonesia, LIPI. LASEMA-CNRS, KITLV-Jakarta.
30 Indra J. Pilliang et. al (eds.), 2003, Otonomi Daerah: Evaluasi & Proyeksi, Jakarta: 
Yayasan Harkat Bangsa bekerjasama dengan Partnership for Governance 
Reform in Indonesia. See also series of Indonesia Rapid Decentralization 
Appraisal conducted by The Asia Foundation since 2001.
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institutional transformation in this new democratic regime. In 
contrast to the previous regime, the state no longer enjoys central 
privileged position in the public policy process. Though the state still 
perform vital roles in the new regime, it becomes only one among 
many stakeholders whose consents are necessary in for every decision 
the state makes. Unfortunately, through out this institutional 
transformation, the new democratic regime has been unable to 
construct new hegemonic structure to replace the previous one. 
This renders the state as a hollow or merely empty arena for political 
contestation and neglecting its normative role, namely to allocate 
value before its people in an authoritative way.31 In this situation the 
state has been conquered by its people in the name of democracy, 
and severely obstructed in performing the policy-making process in 
the name of representing collective identity.
This design of decentralizing the authority and reducing the 
authority of the state has been largely reflection of the experience 
with the previous authoritarian and centralized regime, where the 
state power is prone to abuse. However, by doing so, this design 
neglect one crucial role the state had been carrying that is to govern 
the diversity of Indonesian society. The design of minimal state in 
the democratic regime in Indonesia presupposes that the individual 
citizens act as active and rational citizens in their engagements in the 
market economy and liberal political processes. However, this has 
been hardly the case with the Indonesian citizens.
Up until the collapse of the New Order regime, the state evolves 
in such a way to resemble Lijphart’s idea of consociational politics. As 
an illustration, primordial affiliation has never been officially declared 
as a basis for political recruitment, yet bureaucracy and the military 
have been informally used for maintaining ethnic distribution within 
it. Distribution of cabinet seats always, no matter who president is, 
consider ethnic and religious distribution seriously to ensure that every 
ethnic and religious groups represented in the cabinet proportionally. 
31 Easton, David, 1965, Framework for Political Analysis, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Clift.
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reduce the potential of both vertical and horizontal conflict. 
If bureaucracy serves a representative mission, what happens 
with political parties? The power basis of each political party 
resembles primordial affiations conjoined with spatial distributions. 
Each political party has its own regional bases or strongholds. For 
example, Abdulrahman Wahid’s party, namely Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa (PKB), would always win in east Java, and Amien Rais’s party 
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)—would always win in the area where 
the urban-based Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah hold local 
influence. This political party has limited support from the Balinese, 
who are mostly Hindus. Obviously, Indonesia has no political party 
as a medium for the people’s representation as citizens per se. Yet, 
political party affiliation is neither based on a party’s platform or 
its commitments. Affiliation, instead, is dependant on the party’s 
identifaction to certain notion of primordial identity. Observers of 
Indonesian politics call this phenomena politik aliran, suggesting 
that political behaviour is set by affiliation to a particular grouping.32
Such anecdotal evidence is sufficient to suggest that apart 
from national nationalism, there are sub-national nationalisms. The 
uniting power of the sub-national nationalism can include territorial 
attachment, ethnic grouping, or religious affiliation. This level of 
nationalism unites less than the total of the Indonesian population. 
It nonetheless is more authentic or natural than the national-wide, or 
the ‘wider’, nationalism project. The latter, in essence, is constructed 
by the state within its desperate attempt to unite the entire population 
into a new collective identity resembling the idea of civic nationalism. 
The newly constructed collective identity so far has not been able 
replace the authentic or natural types of nationalism. People could 
be nationalist according the state’s term and, at the same time, also 
be considerate of ethnic or religious nationalism.
The principles, values, and mechanism of democracy are expected 
to serve as the new myth to construct new hegemonic structure 
in Indonesia. However, the process taking place so far shows that 
32 See Geertz, C., 1976, The Religion of Java, University of Chicago Press
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19democracy is practiced only merely as formal institutions, procedures, 
and mechanisms.33 This proves to be leading to ungovernable situation 
both for decentralization and democratization process in Indonesia 
since there is almost no control over the substances of the issues 
brought forward through the democratic institutions, mechanisms, 
and procedures. The previous regimes used their hegemonic 
position to govern the substance of the expressions and aspirations 
of particular groups in Indonesian society. The current democratic 
regime lacks such capacity to construct hegemonic structure. It relies 
on the formal institutions, procedures, and mechanisms assuming 
that once set in motion they will simultaneously work to produce 
democratic substances. 
 Amidst the problem of the absence of active citizenship, 
strong particular social formation and identities based on ethnic 
and religious cleavages exacerbated by acute economic gap among 
these groups and the necessity to get state’s authorization for access 
to resources, identity politics become one of the most viable and 
feasible instruments for most Indonesians for their political, 
economic, and social survival. The institutions, mechanisms and 
procedures provided by the democratic regime further facilitate this 
process. Thus, it is not a surprise to see the discourses of identity 
politics though it has strong discriminative and exclusive tones also 
invoke principles and values associated with democracy like equal 
recognition of one’s cultural expression, indigenous rights, and even 
right for self - determination.
The following part will discuss how identity politics gain 
prominence in post–1998 political discourse and lead to the 
proliferation of local governments in Indonesia. The discussion will 
also include how political elites, both at national and local levels, 
contribute to the production and reproduction of this identity politics.
33 Harris, John; Kristian Stokke; and Olle Törnquist (eds.), 2005, Politicising 
Democracy: the New Local Politics of Democratisation, Palgrave Macmillan.
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The previous section revealed the setting in which proliferation 
of local government in post-1998 Indonesia takes place. This section 
offers an interpretation as to why it happens in the way it does. 
The first part will identify the changing nature of the opportunity 
structure within which proliferation of local governments appears 
to be favourable (although, not the best option). The second part 
describes typical ways and the strategies employed by the involved 
parties to gain a new entity at the local government level. The 
preference for the proliferation of local governments and the way to 
gain the preference are, to some extent, framed by the prevalence of 
identity politics within the country.
The changing of the opportunity structure
The description in the previous section indicated that the 
growth of local government entities intended to equip the state with 
an instrument to better govern and serve its subjects. Establisment of 
new local governments in Indonesia, indeed, has been taking place 
from time to time not only during the Post–1998 context. However, 
in Post–1998 Indonesia this phenomenon has taken place in greater 
magnitude than ever before.34 This change of pace is supposedly 
structured by the change of opportunities due to the new dynamic 
within state-society relationship. The root of the structural change 
was due to the changed nature and character of governance–in 
particularly, the way the state corresponded with society.
The case of Aceh clearly demonstrate that developing an entity 
of local government is linked with issues of local identity. This was 
particularly so in the case of West Papua or Irian Jaya. The point here 
is that each local government serves as an anchor for the existing 
social grouping to articulate their particular identity. In other words, 
given the fact that organisationally speaking the state sets itself up 
in several layers, this grouping confronts several choices–and as 
many as the state. The layers of government relevant in this analysis, 
34 Furthermore, this analysis is not to question the total number of local 
governments, despite the fact it raises public concerns already.
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21however, is the one which granted autonomy. Why is that so? 
Anchoring a collective identity of the ‘local’ is not merely a matter 
of differentiating a collectivity from the other, but also a matter of 
making it functional. Only local governments which are granted 
autonomy are relevant for making the collectivity functional. There 
has been no or only very minimum demand for having more sub-
district governments, despite the fact that this layer of government 
is granted with a particular territory and the head of sub-disctrict is 
responsible for coordinating various sectoral agencies.
The proliferation of local government here is seen to be 
the political expression of certain identities demanding political 
recognition. It demands the central government to recognize their 
political expression by granting an autonomous local government so 
the associated group of people has opportunity to administer their 
local affairs, including access to resource and their usage. 
The proliferation of local governments signifies the participatory 
nature of policy making in Indonesia. Participatory policy making 
takes place not merely on every issue, but also on deciding the fate 
of the state. When we talk about participation, we usually mean that 
the state is no longer in a position to decide on policy as it pleases. 
We are now witnessing a participatory process in which the state 
is a subject matter to be decided. The fate of the state, whether to 
be proliferated or not, is decided by the central government but 
the initiative mainly comes from the below. Obviously, the policy 
making at issue here is quite important since it, in turn, affects the 
fate of participation itself. The proliferation of local governments in 
Indonesia represents the reversal of the political game in response 
to the crisis of legitimacy in the central government for performing 
centralised policy making.
This situation opens up opportunity for many groups based 
their social formation combination of ethnic, cultural, and religious 
sentiments to demand political recognition from the central 
government. Some common features in the narratives of their 
demand for their own local government are that they need their 
own local government so they can have better access to state public 
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22 services and economic development; they have been set aside in the 
public service provision and development process by their current 
local government–usually claimed to be dominated by other social 
groups in that region; and the demand for a separate local government 
usually further justified by arguments that the related social group has 
justifiable historical and cultural claims over the related territory.35
This process has also been proven to be elite captured. During the 
feasibility research in Adonara; East Flores, the author found out that 
the main proponents for the formation of new district in this region 
were mixture of local elites who were engaged in politics at central 
government and local elites who resides in that particular region. The 
elites who engage in politics at the central government served to link 
and bring the initiative from the local level into central government 
agenda. Simultaneously, the elites who engaged in politics at local 
level mobilize local public opinion to give leverage for their cause at 
the central government.
In that case of Adonara, the author found out that these elites 
expected some concessions once the formation of new district was 
authorized by the central government. In one particular opportunity, 
it was revealed that one of the most prominent proponents for the 
establishment of new district in that region was owner of a construction 
company. He expected that construction projects following the 
establishment of new district in that region would be granted to his 
company. These findings confirm the studies compiled in the book 
edited by Nordholet and van Klinken that conclude decentralization 
and democratization in Indonesia has become elite captured.36
This does not mean that the central government authorizes 
every single demand for proliferation of local government. The 
central government has its own measurement instrument of minimal 
35  See for example Santoso, Purwo and Wawan Mas’udi (eds.), 2009, Banyak Jalan 
Menuju Roma: Pengembangan Adonara, Kabupaten Flores Timur, Department 
of Government Politics, Gadjah Mada University and the District Government 
of East Flores.
36 See Nordholt, Henk Schulte and Garry van Klinken (eds.), 2007, Politik 
Lokal di Indonesia (trans. Renegotiating boundaries local politics in post-Suharto 
Indonesia by Bernard Hidayat), Jakarta: KITLV and YOI
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once again, the lack of legitimacy of the central government has 
been an obstruction to enforce this measure more effectively and 
strategically for broader national interest.  
Proliferation of local government has become an issue more 
dominated by stakeholders at local level rather than the central 
government. The main consideration for the decision whether to 
proliferate the local government or not has also been more dictated 
by the public at the local level rather than the interest of the central 
government. In one sense, this may be a good sign of the growing 
prominence of the public voice in the policy decision making 
process. However, with no control over the substance of the voice 
that seemingly bring forward democratically, it turns out to have 
some unintended consequences when this bottom up policy making 
process occurs simultaneously with the phenomena of hardening 
identity politics and elite captured democracy.
Transforming nation-state
The notion of nation-state thus implies that the state not only is 
capable of, but also legitimately, serves as a collective indentity of its 
citizens. Despite the fact that nation-state is a problematic notion, it 
was so powerfull in blending diverse identity of its individual citizens. 
It even claims to serve and be capable of gaining legitimacy to act as 
an instrument to serve the public interest.
Initially, democratization and decentralization in Indonesia was 
expected to ensure that the state performs this role to serve the public 
interest effectively. However, it turns out that these processes in Indonesia 
rather further consolidate more particular collective identities than the 
national identities. The proliferation of local governments may signify 
the expansion of the state purportedly to enhance its capacity to deliver 
public service provision. However, the way this process has been carried 
on in Indonesia has bent this process to produce somehow fragmented 
society, referring to Leibfried and Zürn. 
37 PP 78 Tahun 2007 tentang Tata Cara Pembentukan, Penghapusan, dan Peng-
gabungan Daerah. 
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more and more like mosaic where each local government represents 
certain ethnic groups. It goes into the direction where we have multiple 
states and multiple nations within a single overarching nation–state. 
Unfortunately, there have been only minimal attempts to construct 
this string of mosaic into a new broader framework of nation state. 
Simultaneously, at the local level this situation has not been perceived 
as an opportunity to further institutionalize democracy at local level 
and becomes further drawn into elite captured and dominated.38 
The central government lacks the legitimacy to impose some 
kind of order to govern the too enthusiastic interpretation of freedom 
and liberty provided by the democratic regime. The most frequent 
responds tend to resort back to the monolithic style of governance 
similar to one assumed by the centralistic regime of ‘Guided 
Democracy’ and especially ‘New Order’. 
The proliferation of local governments unfortunately has been 
also failing to keep up with its initial claimed goals of deepening 
democracy at local level and enhancing state’s public service delivery. 
The introduction of democratic procedures and mechanisms at 
the local level seem to be anachronistic as the public at this level 
recognize their being rather as part of a collectivity based on the 
ethnic/religious identity instead of an active citizen. This further 
specify the fragmented character of Indonesian multiple nations–
states each ruled by their own oligarchs.39
This situation is in contrast with the experience in the 
European countries that have been undergoing more outword 
looking state institutional transformation. The deep–rooted and well 
institutionalized principles and values of liberal democracy, despite 
some variations among those countries these common principles 
and values to great extent may serve as the unifying bases for supra–
national institutional arrangement like European Union.
38  See Törnquist, Olle; Stanley Adi Prasetyo; Teresa Birks (eds.), 2010, Aceh: The 
Role of Democracy for Peace and Reconstruction, PCD Press
39  For the reconsolidation of oligarchies under post–1998 democratic regime in 
Indonesia see Robison, Richard and Vedi Hadiz, 2004, Reorganizing Power in 
Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in the Age of Market, Routledge
PCD Journal Vol. III No. 1-2 2011
25Conclusion
The nature of the problem is set by the acceptance of the incoming 
wave of democrasisation which, in fact, operationalises the principal 
of liberal governance.40 Democratisation has been top place on the 
reform agenda. But in this regard, there is one thing to bear in mind, 
the adopted model of democracy actually refers to the idea of liberal 
democracy. The fact that the reform was possible only during the state 
of crisis, and that the main spirit driving the reform was to see the end 
of authoritarian rule, would indicate that the state was actually left 
bound to the whatever decision  that won public support.
The granting of autonomy to district level government and 
establishment new units of this aunomous local government has been 
diffusely articulated. The policy to establish new autonomous local 
government has been articulated in the one hand to enhance the 
state’s capacity to deliver public service to its citizens and on the other 
hand as an anchor for the predominant social groups in the respected 
region to articulate their particular identity. Both naratives have been 
put into arguments that favor democratization and decentralization 
policies in Indonesia that is to reorient the state operation more 
toward the welfare of its citizens and make the governance process 
more participatory, transparent, and accountable. These arguments 
are also oftenly accompanied by such claims like indigenous rights, 
local wisdoms, etc. This scheme, when runs effectively, is expected 
to enhance state’s legitimacy and provide an alternative model 
besides the centralistic, state dominated and security-based model of 
governance to build state’s legitimacy.
Unfortunately, as mentioned before, these narratives lack 
a well-defined plan and hand-over almost the whole process of 
transformation to the negotiation among the involved actors. The 
arguments mentioned above seem to have their meaning bended 
in this negotiation process. It is noteworthy that many of the 
40  The underlying idea behind the reform has been to minimise the role of the 
state, including in the main pillar of New Order government–the military and 
the bureaucracy. In fact, the agenda of reform was to curb military engagement 
in politics and ensuring that bureaucracy is led by elected officers. For this 
reason, general elections are considered as prerequisite for further changes.
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are also brought in the name claiming the neglected right of certain 
group by other social groups. The process establishment of many 
new autonomous region and government involved those arguments 
mentioned above directed, not toward the central government in 
Jakarta, but to other social groups considered as alien - pendatang. 
This is also usually related to the dynamics of power relations among 
the elites both at local and national level through both formal and 
informal channels.41 
Obviously, the question is how do we comprehend this proses of 
change? The situation afforementioned illustrates how same principles, 
values and procedures are used to pursue different motives and goals 
which somehow contradictory to the very same principles, values, 
and procedures. The notion of reform requires careful qualification 
because it is the state that has no control over itself, let alone over the 
society. Basically, everyone is in favour of reform. But everyone has 
their own interpretation of what reform he/she means by reform is. For 
this reason it is important to bear in mind that the notion of reform 
is, in fact, not based on a predetermined design. It is more products 
or consequence of negotiation among competing groups than well-
deliberated and planned goals. We cannot treat the reform as a usual 
policy process given that the idea of reform itself is not easily agreed 
upon. For this reason it is safe to suggest that the direction of change 
depends on the way the public understands the state.
This article proposes an alternative approach to respond this 
current situation of proliferation of local governments for the causes 
of both reproducing national unity and deepening democracy as its 
concluding remarks.
This is bound to be a complex and thorough attempts that 
requires careful and deliberate measures since the adopted model of 
governance is found to be incompatible with the social formation 
where it is to be implemented. The broader context in Indonesia also 
exacerbates the complexity where we find the central government 
lacks the legitimacy to impose its policies from above and such 
41  See Nordholt and Klinken (eds.), op.cit. 
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acceptable. However, it is necessary to have the democratic regime 
stands as hegemony in order to govern the fluid political dynamics 
of Indonesian society. It is just that it cannot be done as it used to be 
in the previous regime through imposition of command and control 
from central government, since such attempt is hardly acceptable in 
the context of democratic regime and would be very likely to be 
counterproductive against the already dwindling legitimacy of the 
central government.
The alternative way proposed here is for the central government 
to get the public at local level engage through their local government 
as its agents. This is to be attempted through more through discursive 
engagement to mobilize consensus among the stakeholders than 
merely relying on command and control mechanisms such as used in 
the previous regime. The author has proposed this approach in several 
research projects related to the formation of new local governments in 
regions with specific and particular needs like Papua and now is being 
involved in similar research for the context of national border areas. 
From the experience in those researches public service provision 
and welfare are strategis issues for a common starting point. This 
is because despite of the dwindling public trust toward the central 
government, they still expect the state to effectively carry their 
distributive roles. The proliferation of local governments in Indonesia 
takes place mostly in the remote areas where the state presence is 
hardly found or at the best they use to come rather in their leviathan 
face. This situation should be perceived as an opportunity for the 
central government to adjust the ways it presents itself and to 
construct national unity.
Some of the main obstacles commonly faced are, still, the lack 
of legitimacy of the central government before the local public in 
the related regions and the strong inclination among some of the 
decision makers and bureaucrats to monolithic model of governance 
and their reluctance to engage discursively to reconstruct the national 
unity through different approaches. However, such attempt is worth 
trying if Indonesia is to break out from the trap of bi-polar opposition 
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28 between centralized and decentralized model of governance.
For this alternative way to work it also requires more active part 
from the public at the local level. The central government will not 
turn into this more consensual approach by itself. Such initiative 
should come from the public, and if its work for the local elites to 
push their agenda into the central government policy agenda, this 
should be work for the more civic minded citizens.  
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